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Abstract
According to Bayesian epistemology, the epistemically rational agent
updates her beliefs by conditionalisation: that is, her posterior subjective
probability after taking account of evidence X, pnew, is to be set equal to
her prior conditional probability pold(·|X). Bayesians can be challenged
to provide a justification for their claim that conditionalisation is recom-
mended by rationality — whence the normative force of the injunction to
conditionalise?
There are several existing justifications for conditionalisation, but none
directly addresses the idea that conditionalisation will be epistemically
rational if and only if it can reasonably be expected to lead to epistemi-
cally good outcomes. We apply the approach of cognitive decision theory
to provide a justification for conditionalisation using precisely that idea.
We assign epistemic utility functions to epistemically rational agents; an
agent’s epistemic utility is to depend both upon the actual state of the
world and on the agent’s credence distribution over possible states. We
prove that, under independently motivated conditions, conditionalisation
is the unique updating rule that maximizes expected epistemic utility.
1 Introduction: Justifying conditionalisation
According to Bayesian orthodoxy, the ideal epistemic agent can be modelled as
follows. The agent contemplates a set Ω of possible worlds. At every time, the
agent’s epistemic state can be represented by a probability function p over Ω
(that is, probabilism holds). A learning event occurs when, for some subset X
of Ω, the agent learns that the actual world is a member of X . On learning this,
the agent updates her probability function by conditionalisation on X . That is,
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her new credence function is related to her old by
pnew(·) = pold(·|X),
where the conditional probability p(A|B) is deﬁned by
p(A|B) := p(A ∧B)
p(B)
.
Real epistemic agents are not (at least not quite) like this: Bayesian episte-
mology is a normative theory, rather than a purely descriptive one. But then
Bayesians face the challenge: whence the normative force of the injunction to
conditionalise?
One answer is ‘it’s obvious that conditionalisation is the epistemically ratio-
nal way to update one’s credence distribution’. This is true, but it is better if we
can justify the obvious. Existing justiﬁcations for conditionalisation include: a
Dutch Book argument (if you update your beliefs other than by conditionalisa-
tion, then a Dutch Book can be made against you [9]); an appeal to a Principle
of Minimum Information (conditionalisation gives the posterior credence dis-
tributions that are ‘closest’ to your prior distribution while being consistent
with the fact that you have just learnt X [13]); an appeal to a Principle of Re-
ﬂection (Reﬂection entails conditionalisation [11]); and a symmetry argument
([10]:331-337). While these approaches have their interest and merits, none di-
rectly addresses the idea that conditionalisation will be epistemically rational if
and only if it can reasonably be expected to lead to epistemically good outcomes.
This paper applies the approach of cognitive decision theory to provide a new
justiﬁcation for conditionalisation, based on precisely that idea. We assume that
an epistemically rational agent always chooses that epistemic act that maximizes
his expected epistemic utility, and we prove that, under independently motivated
conditions, conditionalisation maximizes expected epistemic utility.
Section 2 is an introduction to the basic ideas of the cognitive decision
theory we will use, including that of epistemic utility. We illustrate, by means
of a toy example, how the fact that a given agent will always maximize expected
epistemic utility is supposed to determine his choice of updating policy.
Section 3 contains the central claims of this paper. We note (section 3.1)
that an agent faithfully represented by cognitive decision theory might (depend-
ing on the form of his utility function) be forbidden to hold some particular sub-
set of possible credence distributions, on the grounds that the act of continuing
to hold one of those credence distributions fails to maximize expected epistemic
utility calculated with respect to that same credence distribution; that is, it may
be that some credence distributions undermine themselves. We then prove (sec-
tions 3.2 and 3.3) that, of all possible belief-updating policies, conditionalisation
maximizes expected epistemic utility provided only that the conditional proba-
bility distributions are not self-undermining in this sense.
There are two perspectives one might take on this result. First, if we re-
gard it as a rationality constraint that the epistemic utility function must not
forbid a priori any credence distribution in this way, then we will regard the
2
proof as showing that for any epistemically rational agent, conditionalisation
maximizes expected epistemic utility. Second, whether or not we accept that
constraint as a necessary condition for epistemic rationality, it has been shown
for an arbitrary epistemic utility function that the EU-maximizing agent condi-
tionalises whenever his conditional posterior does not undermine itself. Since an
agent whose conditional posteriors do undermine themselves obviously should
not conditionalise, this is not only as strong an optimality proof as someone
unwilling to accept constraints on utility functions can reasonably expect – it is
also as strong an optimality proof as she could want.
Section 4 considers a few particular candidate epistemic utility functions,
by way of illustration. Section 4.1 suggests a plausible epistemic utility function,
and discusses how this particular utility function encodes a respect for epistemic
values such as truth and verisimilitude. Section 4.2 discusses a prima facie intu-
itive, but on reﬂection less plausible, utility function that has been considered in
the literature, according to which epistemic utility is linearly related to degree
of belief in the truth. We discuss an objection to the approach of this paper:
the objection that the possibility of utility functions such as this undermines
the whole decision-theoretic approach to probabilist epistemic rationality.
Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Cognitive decision theory
This section introduces the basic ideas of the cognitive decision theory we will
use: states, probability distributions, epistemic acts, act availability, epistemic
utility and expected epistemic utility. We explicate each of these notions below
(section 2.1), and illustrate the theory throughout by means of a toy model
of a simple cognitive decision process. Following this exposition, section 2.2
mentions, only to set aside, two closely related issues that we do not intend
to address: the place (or lack of it) of cognitive decision theory in an ‘all-
things-considered’ decision theory, and the relevance (or lack of it) of epistemic
utility to the advisability of gathering, as opposed to epistemically responding
to, evidence.
2.1 The framework of cognitive decision theory
Some cognitive states are, epistemically speaking, better than others. For ex-
ample, it is (presumably) epistemically better to have higher credences in truths
and lower credences in falsehoods. According to the cognitive decision-theoretic
approach, epistemic rationality consists in taking steps that can reasonably be
expected to bring about epistemically good outcomes.
Cognitive decision theory provides a framework in which the ideas of the
preceding paragraph can be made precise and quantitative. The decision prob-
lems with which we will be concerned take the following form. The agent begins
in some ﬁxed belief state (that is, he holds some ﬁxed initial credence distri-
bution). He knows that he is about to receive some new piece of information,
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from among a ﬁxed range of possibilities. Before receiving the information, he
chooses an updating policy: that is, he speciﬁes, for each of the possible pieces
of new information, how he will change his credence distribution if that turns
out to be the information that he does in fact receive. The decision he has to
make is the choice of an updating policy.
EXAMPLE.Mike has a coin. He is unsure as to whether or not it is a fair coin
— speciﬁcally, he assigns 50% credence to its being fair — but he is (let us
suppose) certain that either it is fair or it is weighted in such a way that the
chances for outcomes (Heads,Tails) on a given toss are ( 1
4
, 3
4
) respectively.
The coin is about to be tossed; after observing the result of the toss, Mike
will reassess his degrees of belief as to whether or not the coin is fair. He
must decide in advance how the reassessment will proceed: which credence
distribution he will move to if he sees heads, and which if he sees tails. We
want to know how that decision should proceed.
The remainder of section 2.1 spells this out in more detail, in a framework of
cognitive decision theory. (Cognitive decision theory is in many respects similar
to ordinary, prudential decision theory; our framework is loosely based on that
of Savage [8].)
States. The agent contemplates a set S of (mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive) possible states of the world; he is unsure as to which element of
S obtains. S can be thought of as a partition of the set of possible worlds.1
For our toy example, the states might be as follows:
S = {sFH , sFT , sUH , sUT },where sFH : coin fair, outcome of toss is H
sFT : coin fair, outcome of toss is T
sUH : coin unfair, outcome of toss is H
sUT : coin unfair, outcome of toss is T.
Probability distributions. The agent does, however, have deﬁnite subjec-
tive degrees of belief as to which state obtains: his belief state is, at any time,
represented by some probability distribution p over S. We write P for the set
of all probability distributions over S.
The agent’s prior. One particular probability distribution p∗ ∈ P represents
the agent’s prior belief state — his belief state before learning the evidence,
when he is making his cognitive decision.
Mike’s prior belief state is represented by the following probability distribution
over S :
p∗(sFH) = 14 ;
p∗(sFT ) = 14 ;
p∗(sUH) = 18 ;
p∗(sUT ) = 38 .
1We will assume throughout that S is ﬁnite. This is merely for simplicity of exposition.
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Experiments. An experiment is a sitution in which the agent is to receive
some new piece of information, from among a set of mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive alternatives. Mathematically, an experiment is represented
by a partition E of S; we say that an experiment E is performed (for a particular
agent) when the members of E become epistemically distinguishable from one
another (for that agent).
Mike’s experiment is given by E = {H,T}, where H = {sFH , sUH} and
T = {sFT , sUT }.
Available acts. The set AE of acts that are available given experiment
E is supposed to reﬂect the possible courses of (epistemic) action among which
the agent must choose. An available epistemic act a ∈ AE is an assignment of a
probability distribution to each piece of possible information Ej ∈ E, with the
intended interpretation that if a(Ej) = pj , then pj is the probability function
that an agent performing act a would adopt as his credence distribution if he
received the new information that the actual state was some member of Ej .
(We make no assumption that the ‘choice’ between acts is a voluntary one.)
The acts that are available to Mike as a result of his experiment E = {H,T}
are just those that assign one probability distribution over S toH , and another
(not necessarily distinct) to T .
Acts. There is also a wider notion of epistemic act; the acts in this wider sense
form a superset of the available acts a ∈ AE. In the wider sense, an epistemic
act a′ ∈ A is an assignment of a probability function to every state s ∈ S. The
intended interpretation is that, if a(s) = ps, then ps is the probability function
that an agent performing act a′ would adopt as his credence distribution if state
s in fact obtained.
An act a′ ∈ A will fail to correspond to any available act a ∈ AE iﬀ there
is any pair of states s1, s2 ∈ S such that (i) s1 and s2 are members of the same
element Ej of the partition E, but also (ii) a′(s1) = a′(s2). When this happens,
a′ is an act that the agent is not able to perform, since performing act a′ would
require the agent to respond to information that he does not have (hence our
refusal to call such acts ‘available’).
Mike would be doing very well, epistemically speaking, if he were to perform
the epistemic act a˜ corresponding to the instruction ‘place credence unity in
the true state’, i.e.
a˜(sFH) = pFH
a˜(sFT ) = pFT
a˜(sUH) = pUH
a˜(sUT ) = pUT ,
where, for each state si, pi(si) = 1. However, this act is not available
given only the experiment E deﬁned above: Mike is going to receive certain
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information only about which side of the coin lands face up, so he cannot
perform any act a′ ∈ A with a′(sFH) = a′(sUH), or one with a′(sFT ) =
a′(sUT ).
Given any available act a ∈ AE, there is a natural way of identifying a
with a particular act (in the wider sense), a′ ∈ A: simply set a′(s) := a(Ej)
whenever s ∈ Ej . Given this identiﬁcation, we will sometimes slide between the
two notations a(s) and a(Ej), for convenience.
Cognitive decision problem. A cognitive decision problem is speciﬁed by
an experiment E. To solve such a problem is to select an updating policy from
AE, the set of acts that are available given this experiment.
Mike’s cognitive decision involves the decision of whether to commit himself
to updating by conditionalisation from his prior p∗ on the result of the coin
toss, or by a particular rival updating policy R (given below) that has just
popped into his head.2
Updating by conditionalisation from the prior p∗ would lead to the following
possible posteriors:3
Cond(H) = p(·|H) =: pH , where pH(sFH) = 23
pH(sFT ) = 0
pH(sUH) =
1
3
pH(sUT ) = 0;
Cond(T ) = p(·|T ) =: pT , where pT (sFH) = 0
pT (sFT ) =
2
5
pT (sUH) = 0
pT (sUT ) =
3
5
.
We stipulate that the alternative updating policy R, on the other hand, is as
2This is a simpliﬁcation, of course. There are actually inﬁnitely many acts that are available
given E; we restrict our attention, in this example, to just two available acts, for simplicity of
exposition.
3Recall that we have deﬁned an act (updating policy) as a function from states (or disjunc-
tions of states) to probability distributions. According to this deﬁnition, conditionalisation
from some prior p∗ and conditionalisation from a distinct prior q = p∗ count as distinct
updating policies, as do conditionalisation from prior p∗ given an experiment E and condi-
tionalisation from p∗ given a distinct experiment E′. Strictly, to pick out a unique act, we
should therefore write Condp
∗
E ; we will shorten this to Cond since the prior p
∗ and experi-
ment E will be held ﬁxed throughout our discussion. This way of speaking has the advantage
that the expected utility (with respect to some ﬁxed probability distribution that may or may
not equal the agent’s prior) of an act will be independent of what the agent’s prior was, and
independent of which experiment is performed. It has the disadvantage that conditionalisation
simpliciter does not count as a single updating policy, which is perhaps contrary to ordinary
usage of the term ‘updating policy’.
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follows:
R(H) = qH , where qH(sFH) = 12
qH(sFT ) = 0
qH(sUH) =
1
2
qH(sUT ) = 0;
R(T ) = qT , where qT (sFH) = 0
qT (sFT ) =
1
4
qT (sUH) = 0
qT (sUT ) =
3
4
.
Cond and R are both available acts after the coin-ﬂip, since each assigns
the same probability distribution (Cond(H) and R(H) resp.) to sFH as
it does to sUH , and the same probability distribution (Cond(T ) and R(T )
resp.) to sFT as it does to sFT . That is, neither Cond nor R makes the
unreasonable requirement that Mike must take a diﬀerent course of epistemic
action depending (say) on whether the world, unbeknownst to Mike, happens
to be in some fair-coin state or in some unfair-coin state; both updating rules
require him to react only to information that the experiment will provide him
with.
We oﬀer no intuitive rationale for the rule R, and indeed we have none. The
point is not that R has any intuitive plausibility whatsoever as a serious rival
to conditionalisation, but rather that R is a course of epistemic action that
an agent could in principle adopt. Our aim is to show that considerations of
intuitive plausibility need not be invoked in order to outlaw R, because the
inferiority of that updating policy will follow by calculation from the decision-
theoretic model.
Epistemic utility functions. A given agent (we are assuming) holds a par-
ticular epistemic utility function — a function U : S × P →  assigning
a real number to each pair consisting of a state and a probability distribution.
U(s, p) represents the epistemic value (“epistemic utility”) of holding credence
function p when state s in fact obtains.4
Note that we allow our notion of utility to be externalist in the sense that we
allow two pairs < s, p >, < s′, p >, in which the agent is in the same cognitive
state but a diﬀerent state of the world in fact obtains, to be valued diﬀerently.
This is to be expected since epistemic rationality may well value truth, over and
above the subjective feelings associated with being in some given belief state.
Presumably, since he is a responsible epistemic agent, Mike attaches a high
epistemic utility to having high degrees of beliefs in truths. In that case, his
epistemic utility function might look something like this:
For arbitrary state s ∈ S and probability distribution p over S ,
U(s, p) = −(1− p(s))2 −Ps′ =s(p(s′))2.
(1)
4A diﬀerent sort of cognitive decision theory (e.g. Levi [4], Maher [5]) focusses on cognitive
acts that involve accepting particular propositions, rather than holding particular probability
distributions. The domain of the epistemic utility function for such acceptance-based cognitive
decision theories is the set of pairs < s,A > of states and propositions: < s,A > is to be read
‘accepting proposition A when state s obtains’. We do not regard such theories as necessarily
in competition with our own; they are engaged in a diﬀerent project.
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Heuristically, we can see that this utility function ‘values truth’ because it
equates the utility of holding credence function p when state s obtains to the
sum of two terms, the ﬁrst of which increases with increasing degree of belief
in the true state s, and the second of which increases with decreasing degrees
of belief in false states s′. (Note the minus signs.)
Expected epistemic utility. We assume5 that the rational epistemic agent
always performs that act that has the highest expected epistemic utility (with
respect to the agent’s prior p∗) of all available acts, where the expected epistemic
utility of an act a (with repsect to probability distribution p) is given by
EUp(a) =
∑
s∈S
p(s) · U(s, a(s)) (2)
Using the alternative notation mentioned above, in which acts are deﬁned
on experiments rather than directly on S, we can also write the expected utility
of a as
EUp(a) =
∑
Ej∈E
∑
s∈Ej
p(s) · U(s, a(Ej)), (3)
where E is the experiment on which the act a is deﬁned.
Iﬀ an act a maximizes expected epistemic utility given an experiment E
(that is, if it has at least as high an expected epistemic utility as any other act
in AE), we say that a is optimal (given E). Iﬀ a is the unique optimal act,
we say that a is strongly optimal (given E). (We will often leave ‘given E’
implicit.)
Being an epistemically rational agent, Mike will choose whichever updating
policy has the higher expected epistemic utility. To see which policy this is,
we evaluate the EU of each policy using Mike’s prior p∗ and his epistemic
utility function U , as follows:
Expected epistemic utility of updating by conditionalisation from prior p∗
given experiment E,
EUp
∗
(Cond) =
P
s∈S p
∗(s) · U(s,Cond(s))
= p∗(sFH) · U(sFH , pH) + p∗(sFT ) · U(sFT , pT )
+p∗(sUH) · U(sUH , pH) + p∗(sUT ) · U(sUT , pT )
= 1
4
(−(1− 2
3
)2 − ( 1
3
)2) + 1
4
(−(1− 2
5
)2 − ( 3
5
)2)
+ 1
8
(−(1− 1
3
)2 − ( 2
3
)2) + 3
8
(−(1− 3
5
)2 − ( 2
5
)2)
= −0.0479.
5Without providing a justiﬁcation. Perhaps the justiﬁcation is that a representation the-
orem shows that any agent whose preferences over acts satisfy certain axioms must be repre-
sentable by some utility function U and some probability distribution p such that he always
prefers an act a to another b iﬀ EUp(a) > EUp(b), with EUp as deﬁned in (3). Or perhaps
the justiﬁcation is simply that the injunction to maximize EU seems intuitively plausible and
gives intuitively plausible results. We won’t go into this issue; we take as a premise, for the
purposes of this paper, that there is some adequate justiﬁcation.
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On the other hand, the expected epistemic utility of adopting the alternative
policy R is given by
EUp
∗
(R) =
P
s∈S p
∗(s) · U(s,R(s))
= p∗(sFH) · U(sFH , qH) + p∗(sFT ) · U(sFT , qT )
+p∗(sUH) · U(sUH , qH) + p∗(sUT ) · U(sUT , qU )
= 1
4
(−(1− 1
2
)2 − ( 1
2
)2) + 1
4
(−(1− 1
4
)2
−( 3
4
)2) + 1
8
(−(1− 1
2
)2 − ( 1
2
)2) + 3
8
(−(1− 3
4
)2 − ( 1
4
)2)
= −0.120.
Since EUp
∗
(Cond) > EUp
∗
(R), Mike will choose to update by Cond rather
than by the alternative policy R.
2.2 Disclaimers
Before proceeding further, we ﬂag two issues that are closely related to the
spirit of the decision-theoretic approach, but that we do not (and need not)
tackle in this paper: the place (or lack of it) of cognitive decision theory in
an ‘all-things-considered’ decision theory, and the relevance (or lack of it) of
epistemic utility to the advisability of gathering, as opposed to epistemically
responding to, evidence.
Epistemic vs. all-things-considered utility. There is a sense in which a
particular belief state can have a high ‘utility’ without it being at all epistemi-
cally rational to pursue that state. A high degree of belief in the existence of a
god, for instance, may make me happy and make my life go better in all sorts
of ways — and thus be of high ‘utility’ in a prudential sense — but yet, if there
is no god then such a belief state is, epistemically speaking, undesirable, and
if the evidence for its truth is slim then it is epistemically irrational to hold
such beliefs. We fully accept that there is also this prudential sense of ‘util-
ity’, and that the demand to maximize prudential utility may conﬂict with the
demands of epistemic rationality. But this does not entail that considerations
of epistemic utility cannot hope to account for epistemic rationality. An epis-
temic utility function, such as those we work with in this paper, is concerned
only with the epistemic desirability of belief states. Where epistemic desirabil-
ity diverges from ‘prudential’ or ‘all-things-considered’ desirability, an epistemic
utility function tracks only the former. Whether and how an epistemic utility
function plays a role in any integrated theory of the ‘all-things-considered’ ratio-
nality of epistemic acts is an important question, but not one we are concerned
with here.
Epistemic vs. non-epistemic acts. It has been argued that a decision-
theoretic framework — cognitive ([6], [2]:127-9) or otherwise ([1]) — can be in-
voked to justify experimentation. However that may be, that is not the project
we are engaged in here. Our application of cognitive decision theory is concerned
with purely epistemic acts ; the act of performing a particular experiment, how-
ever epistemically motivated, is a non-epistemic act. That is, we assume only
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that, given that one has received a given piece of evidence (against one’s will
or otherwise), epistemic rationality requires that one then perform the epis-
temic act of altering one’s belief state in the manner that, in the light of that
evidence, maximizes expected epistemic utility. Whether and how a cognitive
decision theory for epistemic acts could be integrated into a satisfactory decision
theory, paying due respect to epistemic goods, for choices among non-epistemic
acts (including evidence-gathering acts) is an important question, but, again,
not one that we are concerned with here.
3 Conditionalisation and maximization of expected
epistemic utility
This section contains our claims in defense of conditionalisation. We proceed
in three steps. In section 3.1 we deﬁne the notion of a constant act, and a re-
lation we call recommendation between probability distributions. We note an
important consequence of our assumption that an epistemically rational agent
always chooses the epistemic act that maximizes expected epistemic utility: for
some utility functions, there exist probability distributions that the ideal agent
is forbidden to hold on the grounds that they fail to ‘recommend’ themselves.
In section 3.2 we use the notion of recommendation to deﬁne a class QC of
epistemic acts, the quasi-conditionalising acts, and we prove (for an arbitrary
epistemic utility function) that each act in QC maximizes expected epistemic
utility. In section 3.3 we characterize (Corollary 2) a set of epistemic utility
functions for which conditionalisation is optimal. We also prove (Corollary 1;
again for an arbitrary epistemic utility function) that in any case condition-
alisation is optimal if it is even coherent, in the sense that the probabilities
conditionalisation would have the agent adopt are not ones that his own utility
function forbids him ever to hold.
3.1 Constant acts, recommendation, self-recommendation
and stable utility functions
Constant acts. We will have particular interest in the constant acts: those
acts that instruct the agent to adopt the same probability distribution as his
credence function, regardless of which state obtains.
The expression for the expected utility of a constant act takes a particularly
simple form. For arbitrary q ∈ P , let kq denote the constant act that assigns q
to all states, for arbitrary q ∈ P . The expected epistemic utility of a constant
act kq, calculated with respect to the probability function p, is given by
EUp(kq) =
∑
s∈S
p(s) · U(s, q). (4)
The recommendation relation between probability functions. The no-
tion of the epistemic utility of a constant act raises an interesting issue that is
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important to our present project. All constant acts are, of course, always avail-
able in the sense explicated in section 2.1: one does not need to be receiving
any new information about what the world is like in order to perform the act
‘jump to credence distribution q, regardless of what the world is like’. (To put
this point another way: the trivial experiment, {S}, is always being performed,
and all constant acts are members of A{S}). So, at every time, the agent is to
regard all constant acts as available options between which he can choose.
This ever-present availability of all constant acts has an interesting conse-
quence within our cognitive decision theory. Recall (from section 2.1) that we are
assuming that the epistemically rational agent always performs that available
act that maximizes expected epistemic utility. Therefore, an ideally rational
agent is able to hold a probability distribution p as his credence distribution
only if the corresponding constant act kp, by the lights of p itself, maximizes
expected epistemic utility — that is, only if (∀q ∈ P)(EUp(kp) ≥ EUp(kq)).
If this condition fails, the minute the agent found himself holding p, he would
be compelled to move to some other distribution q that maximized expected
epistemic utility calculated with respect to p — which is to say that an ideally
rational agent could not hold p in the ﬁrst place, even for a moment.
We make the following deﬁnitions:
• Say that p recommends q (write p R−→ q) iﬀ, when the only available
acts are the constant acts, kq maximizes expected utility calculated with
respect to p — that is, iﬀ ∀r ∈ P , EUp(kq) ≥ EUp(kr).
• Iﬀ, in addition, p recommends no distribution distinct from q, say that p
strongly recommends q.
• Iﬀ p recommends p, say that p is self-recommending.
• Iﬀ, in addition, p recommends no distribution distinct from p, say that p
is strongly self-recommending.
• Iﬀ p is not self-recommending, say that p is self-undermining.
An epistemic utility function therefore induces a rich structure on the set P
of possible credence functions. The structure of the recommendation relations
between these possible credence functions, for a ﬁxed epistemic utility function,
can be represented by a directed graph. This is illustrated, for a small subset
of the set P of probability functions on S, in Figure 1.
Domain of stability of an epistemic utility function. Clearly, the ex-
tension of the recommendation relation depends on the utility function U . We
can thus classify utility functions based on the structure of the recommendation
relations they induce:
• Say that U is everywhere stable iﬀ, according to U , every probability
distribution is self-recommending.
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p1 p2 p3
p4 p5
KEY:
self-recommending probability function
self-undermining probability function
recommendation relation
Figure 1: Graphical representation of a possible structure of recommendation relations
between five probability functions p1, . . . , p5 ∈ P . In this example, the epistemically
rational agent would not hold p4 as his credence function for any finite length of
time, since the expected epistemic utility, calculated with respect to p4, of jumping
to p5 (performing the constant act kp5) exceeds that of remaining at p4 (performing
the constant act kp4) — since, in other words, p4 fails to recommend itself but does
recommend p5.
• Say that U is everywhere strongly stable iﬀ, according to U , every
probability distribution is strongly self-recommending.
• Say that U is somewhere stable iﬀ, according to U , some probability
distributions are self-recommending and others are self-undermining.
• Say that U is nowhere stable iﬀ, according to U , every probability dis-
tribution is self-undermining.
These four possibilities are illustrated in Figure 2.
We now consider the following question: which of these types of utility
function might an epistemically rational agent hold?
Consider, ﬁrst, Figure 2(d). This represents the recommendation structure
induced by a nowhere stable utility function: no credence distribution recom-
mends itself. In other words, whatever credence function the agent holds, he
should at that same time consider some other credence function to be epis-
temically better by the lights of his current credence function. An agent who
maximized expected epistemic utility with respect to a nowhere stable utility
function would thus suﬀer from an epistemic version of the ‘grass is always
greener on the other side of the fence’ syndrome. As a result, he would not be
able to hold any given credence function for any ﬁnite interval of time, even in
the absence of new information. This is pathological.
Next, consider ﬁgure 2(c). This represents a somewhere stable utility func-
tion: p9, p10 and p12 are self-recommending, but p11 is self-undermining. At
ﬁrst sight, such somewhere stable utility functions (perhaps) also seem to be
pathological — the notion of an ideal agent who held a somewhere stable utility
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p1 p2
p3 p4
p5 p6
p7 p8
p9 p10
p11 p12
p13 p14
p15 p16
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: Recommendation structures induced by various types of epistemic utility
functions: (a) everywhere strongly stable; (b) everywhere stable but not everywhere
strongly stable; (c) somewhere stable; (d) nowhere stable.
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function but also held (for any ﬁnite period of time) a credence distribution that
that utility function deemed self-undermining would be similarly contradictory.
A moment’s reﬂection, however, shows that the problem here, if there is one,
falls short of outright contradiction. Credence functions that fail to recommend
themselves are ‘forbidden points’ in the space P of all possible credence func-
tions. (The sense in which they are ‘forbidden’ is that it is not consistent with
maximization of expected epistemic utility to remain at such a point for a ﬁnite
length of time.) Nowhere stable utility functions, we saw, were pathological
because they rendered all credence functions thus forbidden. We do not have
this problem, though, in the case of somewhere stable utility functions. Pro-
vided that there are still some probability functions that are not ‘forbidden’ in
this sense — provided, that is, that the utility function is not nowhere stable
— there are ways for the agent to exhibit perfectly normal-looking epistemic
behavior, consistent with maximization of expected epistemic utility.
Turn now to ﬁgures 2(a) and 2(b). The distinction between (merely) every-
where stable utility functions on the one hand, and those that are everywhere
strongly stable on the other, also deserves comment. An agent who holds a util-
ity function that is everywhere stable but fails to be everywhere strongly stable
(as in ﬁgure 2(b)) may ﬁnd himself with a choice between constant acts that are
equally good by his own lights: if he currently holds credence distribution p7,
there is a distinct credence distribution p8 such that, by the lights of p7 itself,
kp7 and kp8 are of equal (and optimal) expected epistemic utility. When this
occurs, the agent can stick to his current distribution p7, but it will be equally
consistent with ideal rationality if he chooses to move to p8 on a whim. An
agent whose utility function is everywhere strongly stable (ﬁgure 2(a)), on the
other hand, never has any such free options; he must always, unless new evi-
dence comes along, stick to his current credence distribution. (This distinction
will be of some importance in section 3.3.)
3.2 Theorem: Quasiconditionalisation maximizes expected
epistemic utility
From this point onwards, we will assume that the agent’s prior probabilities
{p∗(Ej) : Ej ∈ E} are all non-zero.6
We give names to two updating policies in which we will have particular
interest:
• Conditionalisation from prior p∗ given experiment E (Condp∗E , or Cond
for short) is deﬁned (as usual) by
Cond: For all Ej ∈ E,Cond(Ej) = p∗(·|Ej).
6This is for simplicity of exposition. Without this assumption, instead of working directly
with available acts in the deﬁnitions and proofs that follow, we would work with equivalence
classes of available acts, under the equivalence relation given by
R1 ∼ R2 iﬀ, for all Ej such that p∗(Ej) > 0, R1(Ej) = R2(Ej).
(Clearly, any two acts that bear this equivalence relation to one another have the same ex-
pected epistemic utility with respect to p∗.)
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• Quasi-conditionalisation from prior p∗ given experiment E (QCp∗E , or QC
for short) is, in general, a set of updating policies rather than a single
updating policy. It is deﬁned as follows:
Quasi-conditionalisation: For any available act Q : E → P , say that
Q is a quasi-conditionalising act (Q ∈ QC) iﬀ, for all Ej ∈ E,
p∗(·|Ej) R−→ QC(Ej).
That is, the quasiconditionalising acts are those acts according to which
the agent, on receiving evidence Ej , moves, not necessarily to the condi-
tional probability p∗(·|Ej), but to some probability distribution q that is
recommended by that conditional probability (where ‘recommendation’ is
as deﬁned in section 3.1 above). (The reason that there may in general
be more than one quasiconditionalising act is that p∗(·|Ej) may in general
simultaneously recommend more than one distribution.) Write QC ⊂ AE
for the set of all quasi-conditionalising acts.
First, we prove that the optimal acts are exactly the quasi-conditionalising
acts.7
Theorem. Of all acts that are available given an experiment E, all and only
quasi-conditionalising acts are optimal. That is,
∀Q ∈ QC, ∀R ∈ AE, EUp∗(Q) ≥ EUp∗(R),
with equality iﬀ R is also a quasi-conditionalising act.
Proof. The expected utility of adopting an arbitrary updating policy R ∈ AE
is given by
EUp
∗
(R) ≡
∑
s∈S
p∗(s) · U(s,R(s)) (5)
≡
∑
Ej∈E
∑
s∈Ej
p∗(s) · U(s,R(Ej)) (6)
≡
∑
Ej∈E
∑
s∈Ej
p∗(s ∧ Ej) · U(s,R(Ej)) (7)
≡
∑
Ej∈E
p∗(Ej) ·
⎛
⎝∑
s∈Ej
p∗(s/Ej) · U(s,R(Ej))
⎞
⎠ (8)
≡
∑
Ej∈E
p∗(Ej) ·
(∑
s∈S
p∗(s/Ej) · U(s,R(Ej))
)
(9)
≡
∑
Ej∈E
p∗(Ej) · EUp∗(·|Ej)(kR(Ej)). (10)
7A form of the proof very similar to the one we present here was independently discovered
by Frank Arntzenius, at the same time as us.
15
p∗
p∗(·|E1)
p∗(·|E2)
p∗(·|E3)
p∗(·|E4)
qa
qb
qc
Figure 3: Diagram to illustrate the concept of a quasi-conditionalising
act. For an available act Q to count as a quasi-conditionalising act, it
has to be the case that, for all possible outcomes Ej of the experiment
E, the conditional probability p∗(·|Ej) recommends the credence function
given by Q(Ej). The diagram represents a situation in which the parti-
tion E has four elements {E1, E2, E3, E4}; two of the conditional probabili-
ties (p∗(·|E1), p∗(·|E3)) are strongly self-recommending, while the other two
(p∗(·|E2), p∗(·|E4)) each recommend two probability functions. In this par-
ticular case, there are four quasi-conditionalising acts. For example, the fol-
lowing act Q′ is a quasi-conditionalising act: Q′(E1) = p∗(·|E1),Q′(E2) =
qb,Q′(E3) = p∗(·|E3),Q′(E4) = p∗(·|E4). Conditionalisation itself is not a
quasi-conditionalising act in the situation depicted, since, here, p∗(·|E2) is self-
undermining.
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Substituting a quasi-conditionalising act Q ∈ QC ⊂ AE for R in line (10)
yields an expression for the expected utility of adopting that act Q as one’s
updating rule:
EUp
∗
(Q) =
∑
Ej∈E
p∗(Ej) ·EUp∗(·|Ej)(kQ(Ej)). (11)
But, by the deﬁnition of quasi-conditionalisation, we have, for all available
acts R ∈ AE, all quasi-conditionalising rules Q ∈ QC and all events Ej ∈ E,
EUp
∗(·|Ej)(kQ(Ej)) ≥ EUp
∗(·|Ej)(kR(Ej)). (12)
Combining (10), (11) and (12) and noting that the coeﬃcients p∗(Ej) are
all nonnegative, we have
∀Q ∈ QC, ∀R ∈ AE , EUp∗(Q) ≥ EUp∗(R). (13)
Finally, we prove that this inequality is strict unless R is also a quasi-
conditionalising act, as follows.
If R is not a quasi-conditionalising act, then there is some Ek ∈ E such that
EUp
∗(·|Ek)(kQ(Ek)) > EU
p∗(·|Ek)(kR(Ek)). Since the terms in the summation
(10) for EUp
∗
(R) and those in the summation (11) for EUp
∗
(QC) can then be
paired oﬀ in such a way that for each pair, the term in EUp
∗
(R) is no greater
than that in EUp
∗
(QC), and there is at least one pair such that the term in
EUp
∗
(R) is strictly less than that in EUp
∗
(QC), it follows that EUp∗(Q) >
EUp
∗
(R).
It is striking that this theorem involves no assumptions whatsoever about
the nature of the utility function — yet we seem (at ﬁrst sight) to have given a
name to a particular set of epistemic acts (viz. QC) and proved that every act
in that set is optimal.
If this were really what we had done, it should arouse puzzlement in anyone
acquainted with ‘ordinary’ (i.e. prudential, non-cognitive) decision theory —
it is a familiar point from that theory that tastes are encoded in the utility
function, so that one cannot prove anything about the EU of a given act without
constraining the utility function. (There is no hope, for instance, of proving
from decision theory alone that a rational agent tries to avoid being eaten by
alligators; I may be perfectly ‘rational’, in the sense that I satisfy the axioms of
decision theory, but happen to like being eaten by alligators, and accordingly
assign high utility to situations in which I receive such treatment.) But our
above ‘ﬁrst-sight’ gloss on the content of our theorem is, of course, not quite
correct. We have not shown, in the absence of any information about the utility
function, that some particular act is optimal. This is because, in the absence of
information about the utility function, we have no idea what the recommended
probabilities {Q(Ej)}Ej∈E are. In other words, while we know (without knowing
anything about the utility function) that all acts that meet the deﬁnition of QC
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are optimal, we do not know which acts (i.e., which functions from E to P)
those are.
3.3 Corollaries: When conditionalisation is optimal
The circumstances under which conditionalisation (as opposed to ‘mere’ quasi-
conditionalisation) is optimal are brought out by the following two corollaries
to our theorem.
Corollary 1. Conditionalisation is optimal for a given experiment E iﬀ the
conditional probabilities {p∗(·|Ej) : Ej ∈ E} are all self-recommending. Iﬀ,
further, these conditional probabilities are all strongly self-recommending, then
conditionalisation is strongly optimal.
Proof. Iﬀ the conditional probabilities {p∗(·|Ej) : Ej ∈ E} are all self-recommending,
then conditionalisation is a quasi-conditionalising act. Iﬀ, in addition, these con-
ditional probabilities are all strongly self-recommending, then conditionalisation
is the only quasi-conditionalising act. Corollary 1 is therefore immediate from
the above theorem.
Corollary 1 establishes that conditionalisation is optimal whenever the con-
ditional probabilities are self-recommending. Now, one who hoped to justify
conditionalisation within a decision-theoretic framework really could not want
stronger support from the mathematics, for the following reason. If the condi-
tional probabilities are not self-recommending, conditionalisation is obviously
not even a live option for our agent — for then, conditionalisation advises him
to move to probabilities that he never would be able to hold, ‘no matter how
he arrived at them’, while remaining an expected utility maximizer. (Compare
our discussion of self-recommendation in section 3.1.) It would be somewhat
worrying if our proof insisted even then that conditionalisation was optimal. So,
corollary 1 establishes that conditionalisation is optimal whenever conditionali-
sation is even a live option. We stress that this follows from the decision theory
alone, with no constraints on the form of the epistemic utility function. This is
our ﬁrst result in support of the normative status of conditionalisation.
Our second corollary concerns a second gloss we might put on our result, if
we are prepared to accept normative constraints on the form of the epistemic
utility function:
Corollary 2. If the agent’s epistemic utility function U is everywhere stable,
then conditionalisation is optimal. If U is everywhere strongly stable, then
conditionalisation is strongly optimal.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Corollary 1.
If it is a rationality constraint that one’s epistemic utility function be ev-
erywhere strongly stable (so that one’s utility function alone does not preclude
holding any particular probability distribution, and always advises one strictly
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to stick to one’s current credence distribution until and unless new evidence
comes along), then Corollary 2 demonstrates that, for any rational agent, con-
ditionalisation is the unique updating policy that maximizes expected epistemic
utility. This would be a second statement in favor of conditionalisation. We
ﬁnd this rationality constraint plausible, but we oﬀer no argument for it here.8
(The reader may or may not ﬁnd that she accepts it without argument.) If the
constraint is not accepted, our categorical claims are restricted to those we drew
above from Corollary 1.
4 A plausible epistemic utility function
So far, we have for the most part focussed on certain abstract features (every-
where/somewhere and weak/strong stability) of the epistemic utility function;
such abstract features have suﬃced to state and prove our claims. However,
in order better to understand what is going on, we need to consider what a
plausible utility function exhibiting some of these features might actually look
like. In section 4.1 we take a brief look at one class of plausible (everywhere
strongly stable) epistemic utility functions, and consider how functions in that
class could encode various epistemic values. In section 4.2 we comment brieﬂy
on a particular somewhere stable utility function, the ‘linear utility function’,
that has appeared in the literature. We answer an objection that the possibility
of somewhere stable utility functions undermines the whole decision-theoretic
approach.
4.1 An everywhere strongly stable utility function
Consider the following utility function schema:
General quadratic utility function : UGQ(s, p) = −
∑
X⊆S
λX(χX(s)−p(X))2,
where χX is the characteristic function of the set X (that is, χX(s) is 1 if
s ∈ X and zero otherwise), and the λX are constant coeﬃcients. (This is a
generalization of the utility function (1) we used in our toy model in section
2.1.) We will now brieﬂy discuss how epistemic utility functions of this form do
justice to various epistemic norms.
8Wayne Myrvold has pointed out (personal correspondence) that the fact that we do have
several other arguments to the eﬀect that (within the domain of applicability of Bayesian
modelling) conditionalisation is always rationally required is relevant here. (Some of these
arguments were cited in section 1.) The expected-utility approach with no rule against some-
where stable utility functions, since it permits updating rules other than conditionalisation, is
in tension with those results. If any of those other arguments is sound (a question we have not
addressed), it may also contain the seeds of an explanation from the perspective of cognitive
decision theory of how and why somewhere stable utility functions should be disallowed. We
have not pursued this line of research.
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Stability. For arbitrary choices of the coeﬃcients λX , UGQ is everywhere
strongly stable. 9 10
A concern for truth. In the ﬁrst instance, UGQ favors placing credence 1
in the true state. This is a property of any stable utility function11, and a
fortiori of UGQ. More generally (and less rigorously), other things being equal,
UGQ favors increasing one’s credence in the true state. (We can see the latter
by noting that UGQ(s, p) is always an increasing function of p(s), and always a
decreasing function of p(s′) for s′ = s.)
Discriminating among falsehoods: taking account of verisimilitude.
A diﬀerent stable epistemic utility function (viz. U(s, p) = log p(s)) encodes
a sort of epistemic perfectionism: according to that utility function, epistemic
utility depends only on credence in the true state. Such perfectionism may, on
occasion, be appropriate. But, often, we will want instead to judge one credence
distribution as epistemically better than another even when both assign the
same degree of belief to the true state, on the grounds that the ﬁrst concentrates
its remaining credence among (false) states that are closer to the truth than
does the second. Our sample schema UGQ can take account of the value of
verisimilitude, by a judicious choice of the coeﬃcients λX : we simply assign
high λX when X is a set of ‘close’ states.
Informativeness. Discussions of the epistemic desirability of holding infor-
mative or contentful beliefs are important in acceptance-based epistemologies,
as opposed to the purely probabilist epistemology under consideration here –
given that you’re going to accept (say) some true proposition, it is epistemically
better to adopt a more informative one, i.e. a stronger one. In the proba-
bilist case, however, the epistemic value of informativeness is already captured
by attaching epistemic value to truth and to verisimilitude – an agent will do
better in terms of truth-credence and verisimilitude by peaking his probability
9Proof: in each case, use Lagrange multipliers to extremize the expected utilityP
s∈S p(s)U(s, p
′) w.r.t. p′, subject to the constraint
P
s∈S p
′
s = 1; thence show that ex-
tremization occurs at p′ = p.
10Everywhere strongly stable utility functions have been discussed in the statistics liter-
ature — outside the context of cognitive decision theory, but in a situation with identical
mathematical desiderata — where such functions are known as ‘proper scoring rules’. See, for
example, Lad [3], Savage [7], for discussion and for lists of other such functions.
11Proof: Consider the totally peaked probability distributions, that assign probability 1 to
some state s ∈ S (and, of course, probability zero to all others s′ = s). Relative to such a
probability distribution, the expected epistemic utility EUp(p′) of an arbitrary probability
distribution p′ just is the utility U(s, p′) of holding p′ when state s obtains. But, if U is
stable, then EUp(p′) must be highest when p′ = p. Thus, U(s, ·) must be highest for the
probability distribution p that is totally peaked on the state s. That is, if U is to be stable,
U must encode the fact that the most epistemically favored probability distribution, when an
arbitrary state s obtains, is the probability distribution that assigns credence 1 to the state s.
That is, whatever the true state of the world, a maximum degree of belief in the true state is
valued higher than any other credence distribution by any everywhere strongly stable utility
function.
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distribution near the true state than he would by having a ‘ﬂatter’ probability
distribution.
4.2 A somewhere stable utility function/Defense of cog-
nitive decision theory
The following somewhere stable epistemic utility function has been discussed
by Horwich [2]:127-9, Maher [5]:177-9, and Weintraub [12]:
Linear utility function : UL(s, p) = p(s).
This utility function has an appealing mathematical simplicity, but, as Maher
and Weintraub emphasize, it leads to very odd results. Speciﬁcally, the only
credence distributions that are self-recommending with respect to this utility
function are the totally peaked credence distributions (p(s) = 1 for some s ∈ S),
and the indiﬀerent distribution (p(s) = 1n for each of n states, n ≤ |S|; again
we assume that S has ﬁnite cardinality). If one were to hold any other credence
distribution, one would maximize EU by shifting to a credence distribution that
is assigns credence 1 to some disjunction of states that one currently considers
most likely.12
What are we to make of this utility function? Maher and Weintraub think
that it contains the seeds of an argument by reductio against the proposition
(CDT), which the approach of present paper has taken as a premise:
CDT The dynamics of rational credence-distribution updating can
be captured by a cognitive decision theory that recommends
maximization of expected epistemic utility.
Maher’s argument, with which Weintraub agrees, can be reconstructed as
follows.13
P1 There exist (in logical space) rational agents who hold some-
where stable utility functions (SSUFs).
P2 If CDT is true, then, for any agent who holds a SSUF, sponta-
neous shifts from one credence function to another are some-
times rational.
12The following feature of this utility function should also be noted: it is not possible, by
conditionalising on any proposition, to move from a probability distribution that (according
to UL) is self-recommending to one that is not. We have not, in fact, been able to ﬁnd any
somewhere stable utility function that does not possess this feature. If it could be shown
that (under independently motivated auxiliary constraints) none exists, this would obviously
strengthen our result (cf. our comments at the end of section 3).
13Our discussion in section 3.1 suggests that the possibility of rational spontaneous shifts is
not the right way to characterize what is odd about somewhere stable utility functions — the
point is rather that, given (CDT), a somewhere stable utility function has the consequence
that some credence functions are ‘forbidden points’, in the sense that the ideally rational agent
cannot hold one of these credence functions for any ﬁnite interval of time. However, we won’t
press this point. Maher’s and Weintraub’s argument applies, in any case, to the possibility of
everywhere stable utility functions that are not everywhere strongly stable.
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C1 If CDT is true, then there exist (in logical space) rational agents
for whom spontaneous shifts are sometimes rational (from P1,
P2)
P3 Such spontaneous shifts of credence are necessarily irrational:
that is, nowhere in logical space are there rational agents who
might sometimes perform spontaneous shifts.
C2 CDT is not true. (from C1, P3)
Clearly, if this argument were sound, the central claim of this paper (that
Bayesians can justify conditionalisation by an appeal to maximization of ex-
pected epistemic utility) would be utterly undermined.
The argument is valid. Our objection to it is that either P1 or P3 is false,
although we are not committed to a view as to which. We choose to insist on the
correctness of the cognitive decision-theoretic approach, and argue by dilemma.
Either shifts could be rational, or they could not. If they could, P3 is false, and
so the argument fails. If they could not, P1 is false, and so the argument fails.
In other words, either somewhere stable utility functions are to be ruled out as
irrational, or they and their consequences are acceptable; in neither case is the
CDT programme itself impugned.
Maher is aware of the possibility of this response. Since he insists absolutely
on the irrationality of shifts (a view with which, as we noted in section 3.3 above,
we are not unsympathetic), he gives serious consideration only to the possibility
of rejecting P1. Maher’s objection to this move is that it is ‘completely ad hoc’,
since such a constraint on utility function lacks ‘any prior plausibility’ (ibid.,
p.179; our emphasis in boldface). Our disagreement with Maher is method-
ological: we don’t see why prior plausibility (i.e. prior to thinking through
the consequences of adopting a somewhere stable utility function) should be
required for rejection of P1. In any case, the problem with rejecting CDT in
response to this argument is that that rejection is no less ad hoc: we are left
with no convincing explanation of why one should maximize expected utility
when choosing whether or not to go for a swim and when choosing whether or
not to accept the proposition that humans are descended from apes, but not
when choosing which credence distribution to adopt.
Incidentally, we would have a paradox for the decision-theoretic approach if
we thought both that somewhere stable utility functions were pathological and
in addition that no everywhere stable utility functions existed. But, as we have
illustrated by example above, this latter condition does not obtain.
5 Conclusion
We have modelled the Bayesian agent’s choice of updating policy as a decision
problem within a cognitive decision theory. By doing so, it is possible to pro-
vide a justiﬁcation for conditionalisation that appeals directly to the idea that
epistemic rationality consists in taking steps that can reasonably be expected to
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lead to epistemically good outcomes. The justiﬁcation is that, under indepen-
dently motivated constraints, conditionalisation maximizes expected epistemic
utility.14
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